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The very idea of legal positivism
Stanley L. Paulson
Introduction
Much in recent discussions on legal positivism suggests 
that the controversy surrounding the notion turns on the 
distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.1 
As a point of departure in distinguishing them, the 
separation principle is helpful.2  At the most general level, the 
separation principle – as Kenneth Einar Himma neatly puts 
it – denies ‘that there is necessary overlap’ between the law 
and morality.3  The separation principle counts, then, as the 
contradictory of the morality principle, according to which 
there is ‘necessary overlap’ between the law and morality, 
however this might be explicated.4  What the legal positivist’s 
1  An excellent discussion, chock full of arguments, is Kenneth Einar Himma, 
‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Legal Philosophy, ed. Jules Coleman et al. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 125-65. 
See, too, the detailed statements in Matthew H. Kramer, In Defense of Legal 
Positivism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004).
2  H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard 
Law Review, 71 (1957-8), 593-629, repr. in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 49-87.
3  Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ (n. 1), 125.
4  The claimed ‘necessary overlap’ between the law and morality is under-
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denial of the morality principle comes to can be refined, we 
are told, by appealing to the distinction between inclusive 
and exclusive legal positivism.  Inclusive legal positivism 
leaves open the possibility that in a given legal system 
there may or may not be necessary overlap between the law 
and morality, while exclusive legal positivism recognizes 
no possibility of necessary overlap.5  Again – this time in 
Matthew H. Kramer’s words – ‘[t]he separability of the legal 
realm and the moral realm, as opposed to their ineluctable 
separation, is the condition [that the inclusive legal positivist] 
seeks to highlight.’6
One can arrive at a broader perspective by opening 
up the field to cover not only inclusive and exclusive legal 
positivism but also non-positivism, represented by the 
defence of the morality principle,7 according to which, again, 
stood in a great variety of ways, as illustrated by prominent examples in 
the recent literature.  See e.g. Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and 
Supra-Statutory Law’ (first publ. 1946), trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson 
and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26 (2006), 1-11; John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 2nd 
edn. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011); Finnis, Philosophy of Law (Collected Es-
says, vol. IV) (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011); Robert Alexy, The Argument from 
Injustice (first publ. 1992), trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley 
L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Lon L. Fuller, ‘The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication’, Harvard Law Review, 92 (1978-9), 353-409, repr. (with 
omissions) in Fuller, The Principles of Social Order, ed. Kenneth Winston, 2nd 
edn. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 101-39. 
5  See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at 210-27 et pas-
sim.
6  Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism (n. 1), 114 (emphasis added).
7  The nomenclature ‘legal non-positivism’ is congenial in suggesting a generic 
reading of the term, such that legal positivism and legal non-positivism 
together exhaust the field.  That is, on the generic reading ‘legal positiv-
ism’ and ‘legal non-positivism’ are correctly read as contradictories.  For an 
illuminating statement of various legal theories, grouped together under 
the ‘positivist’ and ‘non-positivist’ rubrics, see Alexander P. d’Entrèves, 
‘Two Questions about Law’, in Existenz und Ordnung. Festschrift für Erik 
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there is necessary overlap between the law and morality.  It 
is clear that any two of these three views stand in a relation 
of contrariety.8  For example, the cover statements giving 
expression to non-positivism and inclusive legal positivism 
cannot both be true, but they might well both be false, and 
then the cover statement giving expression to exclusive legal 
positivism would be true.
Say what you will about inclusive versus exclusive legal 
positivism – some defend the distinction, others dismiss 
inclusive legal positivism as a non-starter.9  I want in any 
case to argue that a more fundamental distinction within 
the positivist camp lies elsewhere.  The distinction I have 
in mind is that between legal positivism qua naturalism 
and legal positivism without naturalism.  Even though, 
for institutional reasons, legal positivism has largely been 
discussed in a vacuum, there is a standing presumption that 
there are ties between legal positivism and ‘positivism writ 
large’ in the greater philosophical tradition – or, as it would 
be put in present-day philosophical circles, ties between 
legal positivism and naturalism.  What sorts of ties?  In the 
first two parts of the paper, I offer an answer.  In Part One, 
I draw on John Austin’s legal philosophy and argue that 
it reflects the greater philosophical rubric, positivism writ 
large or – my substitution again – naturalism.  And, in Part 
Two of the paper, I address and defend my substitution of 
naturalism for positivism writ large.
Wolf zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Thomas Würtenberger et al. (Frankfurt: Klos-
termann, 1962), 309-20, repr. in d’Entrèves, Natural Law, 2nd edn. (London: 
Hutchinson, 1970), 173-84.
8  See Robert Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’, Ratio Juris, 21 
(2008), 281-99, at 285-7.
9  For criticism, see e.g. Stefano Bertea, ‘A Critique of Inclusive-Positivism’, 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 93 (2007), 67-81; Scott Shapiro, ‘Law, 
Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct’, Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 127-70. 
Kramer replies to Shapiro in Where Law and Morality Meet (n. 1), at 45-75.
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Specifically, in Part One of the paper, two theses are of 
special interest, with the second thesis following from the 
first. My first thesis:  Austin’s naturalism – his reduction, 
at two junctures, of ostensibly juridico-normative concepts 
to matters of fact (namely, to habit and to fear) – is, as he 
contends, sufficient to make out his case on the nature of 
law.  My second thesis, following from the first:  If Austin’s 
move is sufficient, then no thesis respecting a non-contingent 
link between morality and the law can be necessary to 
the explication of the nature of law. Taken together, these 
two theses make a point, I should like to think, of genuine 
significance. That is, if these two theses are indeed correct and 
if Austin’s legal philosophy is representative of traditional 
legal positivism, then the celebrated separation principle 
is not doing the lion’s share of the work in legal positivist 
circles after all.  Rather, the separation principle is simply a 
corollary of naturalism, the overriding view.  
In Part Two of the paper, I take up the substitution of 
naturalism for positivism writ large.  In first thinking about 
how to sort out species of legal positivism, I assumed I 
would be working with positivism writ large as the greater 
philosophical stage on which legal positivism finds its 
place.  A fair bit of reading disabused me of this notion.  To 
be sure, to speak of positivism writ large might well be ap-
propriate if I were directing my remarks to developments 
in philosophy in, say, the mid-nineteenth century.  At that 
point in time, the older Hegelian consensus in Europe had 
been altogether displaced by scientific positivism.  I am 
thinking, for example, of Hermann von Helmholtz, known 
for his pioneering work in physics and physiology, as well 
as for his efforts in recasting Kant’s theory of knowledge in 
a modern, that is, positivistic idiom.10  All of this in the mid-
10  See e.g. Hermann von Helmholtz, ‘Über das Sehen des Menschen’ (lecture 
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nineteenth century.11  By contrast, ‘positivism’ is a term of 
abuse in philosophical circles today.  Jürgen Habermas writes 
that positivism in philosophy proceeds from ‘scientistic 
presuppositions’,12 and Bernard Williams writes that ‘to fall 
back on positivism’ with an eye to avoiding interpretation 
is ‘an offence against truthfulness’.13 
In our time, the view that continues to enjoy a great 
reception in philosophical circles is naturalism.  Willard 
Van Orman Quine, the ‘father of contemporary naturalism’ 
as one writer calls him,14 understands naturalism as the 
appeal to the sciences.  Naturalism, Quine tells us, assimilates 
epistemology to ‘empirical psychology’.15  Quine’s view is 
not, however, the only view of naturalism.  Naturalism is 
greater than Quine, thanks not least of all to the extraordinary 
role he played in begetting it in its contemporary form. 
Quine’s view counts today as one prominent characterization 
in Königsberg 1855), in Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden, 4th printing, 2 vols. 
(Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg, 1896), vol.1, 85-117. 
11  Helmut Holzhey öffers a three-fold characterization of philosophical 
positivism at mid-century: first, knowledge stemming from the sciences is 
privileged, while the philosopher’s claims respecting knowledge are dis-
puted, second, knowledge of reality (Wirklichkeitserkenntnis) is restricted to 
what can be drawn from sense experience, and, third, thought is understood 
solely in terms of the ‘subjective’ function of interpretation along with the 
ordering of the elements of sense experience.  Helmut Holzhey, ‘�er Neu-
kantianismus’, in Helmut Holzhey and Wolfgang Röd, Die Philosophie des 
ausgehenden 19. und des 20. Jahrhunderts [Teil] 2. Neukantianismus, Idealismus, 
Realismus, Phänomenologie (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2004), 30.
12  Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (first publ. 1968), trans. 
Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 88.
13  Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002), 
12.
14  Penelope Maddy, Second Philosophy. A Naturalistic Method (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2007), 4.  A single important figure in contemporary legal philosophy 
writes expressis verbis within the framework of Quinean naturalism, namely: 
Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007).
15  See n. 31 below.
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of naturalism, and �avid Hume’s view counts as another.  I 
return to Hume in Part Two of the paper.
Finally, in Part Three of the paper, I turn to legal 
positivism without naturalism.  Here the overriding figure 
is Hans Kelsen.  While Kelsen is of course defending the 
separation principle, his position represents a wholesale 
rejection of naturalism, which, he insists, is wrong-headed. 
Thus, the idea that the separation principle is but a corollary 
of naturalism can scarcely be attributed to him.  
My greater thesis, then, is that Austin and Kelsen 
represent two poles within legal positivism, namely, legal 
positivism qua naturalism and legal positivism without 
naturalism.  The position represented by Hans Kelsen’s 
colossus16 is, I think, peculiar to him.  By contrast, any of a 
host of other figures in the jurisprudential tradition can be 
substituted for John Austin, a point to which I return.
1. John Austin
It is no accident that Austin’s statement of the separation 
principle is found in a footnote to the text of Lecture V – a 
fairly lengthy footnote, to be sure, where Austin carefully 
sets the stage for a reply to William Blackstone:
 Sir William Blackstone…says in his ‘Commmentaries’, that the 
laws of God are superior in obligation to all other laws…that 
human laws are of no validity if contrary to them…. Now, he may 
mean that all human laws ought to conform to the �ivine laws. 
If this be his meaning, I assent to it without hesitation…. But the 
meaning of this passage of Blackstone, if it has a meaning, seems 
rather to be this: that no human law which conflicts with the Divine 
law is obligatory or binding; in other words, that no human law 
16  The editor of the Hans Kelsen Werke (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007 ff.), 
Matthias Jestaedt, estimates that Kelsen’s published writings run to 17,500 
pages.
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which conflicts with the Divine law is a law…. Now, to say that 
human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, 
that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense.17
Relegating to a footnote what we, influenced by 
H. L. A. Hart, are accustomed to calling the separation 
principle suggests that the real thrust of Austin’s position lies 
elsewhere.  As indeed it does.  Austin, in Lecture VI, devotes 
a good bit of attention to the straightforward reduction of 
the doctrine of sovereignty to concatenations of fact.  His 
lines on habitual obedience are familiar:
The superior which is styled sovereignty…is distinguished…
by the following marks or characters: –1. The bulk of the given 
society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate 
and common superior…[and] 2. That certain individual, or that 
certain body of individuals, is not in a habit of obedience to a 
determinate human superior.18
And, lest the significance of the appeal to habit be 
missed, Austin repeats the point a number of times in Lecture 
VI.19
With this scheme of Austin’s, we have the makings 
of the central argument I wish to attribute to him.  If his 
conceptual repertoire is traceable back to the doctrine 
of sovereignty and if sovereignty is reducible in turn to 
concatenations of fact, then, Austin is arguing, this is 
sufficient to explain the ostensibly normative material of the 
17  John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (first publ. 1863), 5th edn., 2 vols., ed. 
Robert Campbell (London: John Murray, 1885), vol. 1, Lecture V (at pp. 214-
15) (emphasis in original), also in John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (first publ. 1832), ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1954), Lecture V (at pp. 184-5) (emphasis in original).
18  Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture VI (at p. 220) (emphasis in original); Austin, 
Province (n. 17), Lecture VI (at pp. 193-4). 
19  See Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture VI (at e.g. pp. 222, 223-4, 227); Austin, 
Province (n. 17), Lecture VI (at e.g. pp. 195, 198-9, 202-3).
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law.  And if this reduction of sovereignty to fact is indeed 
sufficient, then, by hypothesis, no appeal to morality can be 
necessary.  In other words, Austin has in effect built right 
into his reduction the thesis that there cannot be ‘necessary 
overlap’ between the law and morality.  And there is no 
reason for the proponent of such a theory to pay special 
attention to a separation principle, which has no standing 
as an independent doctrine in the theory.
Before continuing with Austin, I want to underscore 
the general import of what I am drawing from his theory. 
Given the prominence of the separation principle as the 
underlying notion in the myriad Anglo-American defences 
of legal positivism over the past half century, its absence – 
with a single important exception – from the lively European 
debate over legal positivism a hundred years ago strikes one, 
at any rate on first glance, as puzzling.20  The straightforward 
explanation, however, is this.  A host of fin de siècle European 
legal theorists, roughly identifiable as positivists, made the 
very sort of move that Austin made.  That is, they claimed 
that facts of nature are sufficient to explain ostensibly 
juridico-normative material, and since morality cannot, 
then, be necessary, they had no occasion to talk about it.  In 
a word, their move was naturalistic.  
A good illustration is found in the work of Georg 
Jellinek, the most influential figure in public law theory 
(Staatsrechtslehre) on the European Continent a hundred 
years ago, translated in his own day into major indo-
European languages.  In some circles, it is presumed that 
Jellinek is a ‘normativist’, a ‘Neokantian’.  A closer look at 
the texts, however, shows clearly that Jellinek’s celebrated 
doctrine, ‘the normative force of the factual’, reduces without 
20  The exception to the rule is Hans Kelsen, and I take up his position in Part 
Three. 
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remainder to matters physiological or psychological.  And 
the reduction is one of Jellinek’s own making.  As he puts 
it, the ‘normative import’ of the factual counts simply as 
our physiological or psychological tendency to reproduce, 
in our minds, that to which we have become accustomed.21 
This is closer to Hume than to anything in Neokantianism. 
Again, my thesis is that Austinian naturalism – the 
move from the ostensibly normative material of the law to 
concatenations of fact – is standard fare for legal positivists 
generally.  While my thesis may appear to be obvious – and I 
would be pleased if it did – it is hardly the received opinion. 
For example, in his celebrated paper ‘Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals’22 and again in The Concept of 
Law,23 Hart sets out five different doctrines under the rubric 
of legal positivism – command, separation, analysis, judicial 
decisions as logical deductions, and non-cognitivism.  He 
attributes the first three of these to Jeremy Bentham and 
Austin.  The doctrine that I claim is fundamental – naturalism 
– does not turn up on Hart’s list, and it is not implied by 
anything that does turn up there.
21  Jellinek writes:  ‘To seek the basis of the normative force of the factual in 
its conscious or unconscious reasonableness would be utterly mistaken. 
The factual can be rationalized later, but its normative import lies in an 
underived property of our nature, on the strength of which something we 
are already accustomed to is physiologically and psychologically easier to 
reproduce than something new.’  Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 2nd 
edn. (Berlin: O. Häring, 1905), 330, 3rd edn. (1914), 338.  The reduction to 
fact, in Jellinek’s work at this juncture, is captured effectively by Michael 
Stolleis, Public Law in Germany 1800-1914 (first publ. 1992), trans. Pamela 
Biel (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2001), 442-3.
22  See Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n. 2), 601-2 
at n. 25, repr. in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (n. 2), 57-8 at n. 
25. 
23  See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), 302, at note pertaining to p. 185.
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Back to Austin, as promised.  I have spoken of tracing 
the whole of Austin’s conceptual repertoire to the doctrine 
of sovereignty and of reducing sovereignty in turn to 
concatenations of fact.  A comparable argument can be 
generated by looking to Austin’s command doctrine, implicit 
in the doctrine of sovereignty.24  The doctrine of command, 
on one reading of Austin’s treatise, can be understood in 
terms of three components:  the commander’s intention 
that a party act (or forbear from acting) in a particular way, 
the commander’s expression of this intention to the party, 
and – central to the doctrine – the commander’s power to 
impose a sanction should the commandee fail to comply 
with the directive.25  The power to impose a sanction is not, 
however, to be understood as a property of the commander, 
for a commander, characterized in the Austinian theory in 
terms of the power to impose sanctions, might not have 
such power over the particular party to whom he issues his 
directive, as in the case of a sovereign’s putative command 
to another sovereign.  The power to impose a sanction is 
to be understood, in other words, as a relation between 
commander and commandee or, more generally, between 
superior and inferior.26  Austin gives expression to the 
relation – we might call it the ‘power relation’ – when he 
writes: “The term superiority signifies might: the power 
of affecting others with evil or pain, and of forcing them, 
through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one’s 
wishes”.27
24  See Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture V (e.g. at p. 177); Austin, Province (n. 
17), Lecture V (e.g. at p. 132).
25  Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture I (at p. 91, and see p. 89); Austin, Province 
(n. 17), Lecture I (at p. 17 and see pp. 13-14).
26  Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture I (at pp. 96-7); Austin, Province (n. 17), 
Lecture I (at pp. 24-5).
27  Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture I (at p. 96) (emphasis added) (see also p. 90: 
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Fear, a brute fact, is the operative notion here, and the 
argument proceeds just as before.  If Austin’s ‘correlative 
terms’ of obligation and sanction are traceable back to their 
correlative, the command,28 and if the command is reducible 
in turn to concatenations of fact – in particular, to the 
commandee’s fear – then, so Austin, this move is sufficient 
to explain the ostensibly normative material of the law. 29 
And if this move is sufficient, then no appeal to morality 
can be necessary.
It is useful to dwell for just a moment on the concept of 
fear.  Just as no one would claim that sexual desire is acquired 
through reasoning or is the product of experience, so likewise 
for fear.  Notwithstanding the fact that experience may shape 
our responses on both fronts, the phenomena themselves 
have a basis independent of experience.30  Hume speaks of 
natural instinct.  This mention of Hume brings me to Part 
Two, the substitution of naturalism for positivism writ large.
‘that which is not feared is not apprehended as an evil’); Austin, Province 
(n. 19), Lecture I (at p. 24) (emphasis added) (see also p. 16).
28  On ‘correlativity’, see Austin, Lectures (n. 17), Lecture I (at pp. 89, 96, see 
also pp. 91-2); Austin, Province (n. 17), Lecture I (at pp. 14, 24, see also pp. 
17-18).
29  As noted by Hart, Austin also has a second interpretation of the command. 
It turns on his definition of obligation ‘as the “chance or likelihood” that one 
who has been commanded to do or abstain from doing something would 
suffer some evil in the event of disobedience’.  See H. L. A. Hart, ‘Analytical 
Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenhe-
imer’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 105 (1956-7), 953-75, at 965; 
H. L. A. Hart, ‘Legal and Moral Obligation’, in Essays in Moral Philosophy, 
ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 82-107, at 
95-9; Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 23), 282 note at (c), 290 note pertaining to 
p. 83.  For Austin’s own text on ‘chance or likelihood’, see Austin, Lectures 
(n. 17), Lecture I (at p. 90); Austin, Province (n. 17), Lecture I (at p. 16).   
30  I owe the example to H. O. Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 62.
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2. The substitution of naturalism for positivism 
writ large
I remarked in the Introduction that Quine, in the name 
of naturalism, would have us appealing to the sciences.  Epis-
temology becomes ‘empirical psychology’.31  Although there 
are great differences between Quine’s naturalistic enterprise 
and �avid Hume’s, there are similarities, too.  For example, 
many regard Hume’s theory of human nature in Book III of 
A Treatise on Human Nature as a study in moral psychology. 
As one prominent interpreter of Hume puts it, ‘[t]o a large 
extent, Hume’s theory of human nature is not, in our terms, 
philosophical, but psychological’.32  Hume’s famous – some 
will say ‘notorious’ – dictum that ‘reason is, and ought only 
to be the slave of the passions’,33 is most helpfully seen as 
his response to the elevated role played by reason in the 
rationalist philosophies of the Cartesian tradition.34  Hume’s 
tack is diametrically opposed.  He looks inward:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. 
Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, 
31 ‘[T]he epistemological question [is] a question within science: [how hu-
mans] have managed to arrive at science from such limited information. 
Our scientific epistemologist pursues this inquiry…. Evolution and natural 
selection will doubtless figure in this account, and he will feel free to apply 
physics if he sees a way.’  W. V. O. Quine, ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’ 
(lecture of 1975), in Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1981), 67-72, at 72. 
32 Terence Penelhum, ‘Hume’s Moral Psychology’, in Cambridge Companion 
to Hume, ed. �avid Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), 117-49, 
at 119.  Penelhum is not alone.  See also Jerry A. Fodor, Hume Variations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), at 1-27 et passim, who suggests that Hume’s 
naturalism anticipates current work in cognitive science.
33  �avid Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (first publ. 1739-40), 2nd edn., ed. 
P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), II.iii.3. (at p. 415).
34  See Penelhum, ‘Hume’s Moral Psychology’ (n. 32), 119-20, on which I have 
drawn here.
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or real existence, which you call vice.  In which-ever way you take 
it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. 
There is no other matter of fact in the case.  The vice entirely 
escapes you, as long as you consider the object.  You never can 
find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find 
a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this 
action.  Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not 
of reason.  It lies in yourself, not in the object.  So that when you 
pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, 
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling 
or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.35
These notions – feeling, sentiment, instinct, the 
constitution of our nature – have one looking inward.  And 
this, Hume would have us believe, is the source of our 
psychological explanations.
This view of ‘Hume the naturalist’ comes as a surprise 
to those who take their cues from a textbook account of 
Hume, which has him following his empiricist predecessors, 
Locke and Berkeley, while recognizing – and making the 
most of – the scepticism to which their view inevitably leads. 
The argument on behalf of scepticism is familiar.  Empiricism 
has its source in sense experience.  Beliefs that stem from 
sense experience do not lend themselves to justification.  A 
justification requires an appeal to something independent, 
but  there is no way, so to speak, of stepping outside sense 
experience in order to appeal to something independent of 
it.  The result is scepticism.
This point, in explicit criticism of Hume’s scepticism, 
stems, inter alia, from the philosopher Thomas Reid. 
�efending his own view, Reid argues that sensory experience 
is not ‘what we perceive’ but rather that ‘whereby we 
perceive’.36  Norman Kemp Smith – in path-breaking papers 
35  Hume, Treatise (n. 35), III.i.1. (at pp. 468-9) (emphasis in original). 
36  See The Works of Thomas Reid, 8th edn., 2 vols., ed. William Hamilton (Edin-
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a hundred years ago and in an extraordinary treatise on 
Hume some seventy years ago – stands Reid’s interpretation 
of Hume on its head.37  In Kemp Smith’s splendid words: 
Hume ‘is depicted as having done no more than deliver his 
successors from a bondage to which he himself remained 
subject.  A strangely paradoxical verdict!’38  Hume, on Kemp 
Smith’s interpretation, was keenly aware of the scepticism 
inherent in traditional empiricism and sought to provide an 
alternative.  The alternative, naturalism, is found in Book III 
of Hume’s Treatise.  Indeed, Kemp Smith goes on, the best 
way to read Hume is to begin with Book III of the Treatise 
before turning to Book I, whose scepticism will then properly 
be seen as qualified by Hume’s naturalism.
3. Positivism without naturalism. The case of 
Hans Kelsen
Where legal positivism qua naturalism is the point of 
departure, Hans Kelsen is the spoiler.  Other legal positivists 
count as naturalists, arguing that since the facts are sufficient 
to explain ostensibly normative material, morality cannot be 
necessary.  Kelsen offers no such argument,  for he, unlike all 
the others, is not arguing that ostensibly juridico-normative 
material is reducible to fact.  Kelsen defends what he terms 
a normative legal philosophy.
burgh: James Thin, 1895), vol. 1, pp. 108, 112, 117, 121 et passim.  The quota-
tion in the text is Mounce’s tidy summary statement, in Mounce, Hume’s 
Naturalism (n. 30), 1, 54.  Reid’s philosophy is presented in rich detail in 
Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
37  See, in particular, Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume 
(London: Macmillan, 1941).  The early papers are ‘The Naturalism of Hume 
(I.)’, Mind, 14 (1905), 149-73, and ‘The Naturalism of Hume (II.)’, ibid. pp. 
335-47.
38  Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (n. 37), 3.
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Normativity,39 Kelsen tells us, is his alternative to other 
approaches within legal philosophy, but – the rub – there 
has never been any agreement on what he means here.  The 
interpretations of Kelsen’s idea of normativity run the gamut, 
from a counter-factual interpretation of normativity40 to a 
‘justified normativity’ thesis.  The justified normativity thesis 
is far and away the most ambitious reading of normativity in 
Kelsen’s legal philosophy.  It has been attributed to Kelsen 
in different forms with different sorts of argument by no 
fewer than four leading figures – Robert Alexy, Carlos 
Santiago Nino, Joseph Raz, and, a bit earlier, by Alf Ross 
–41 with, so far as I can tell, each writer developing his own 
case independently of the others.  I confine myself here to 
39  Normativity, for many purposes a concept in its own right, has enjoyed a 
good bit of attention in recent philosophy.  See e.g. Joseph Raz, ‘Explain-
ing Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason’, Ratio 12 
(N.S.) (1999), 354-379, repr. in Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1999), 67-89.  See also Alan Millar, Understanding People. Normativity and 
Rationalizing Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); John Skorupski, 
The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010). 
40  In an overview of Kelsen’s work, Robert Walter writes that coercive systems, 
legal systems in particular, are to be interpreted ‘as if they were normative’. 
Walter, ‘Der gegenwärtige Stand der Reinen Rechtslehre’, Rechtstheorie, 1 
(1970), 69-95, at 70 (emphasis in original).
41  See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 4), at 95-123; Carlos Santiago 
Nino, ‘Some Confusions surrounding Kelsen’s Concept of Validity’, Ar-
chiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 64 (1978), 357-77, at 357-65, repr. in 
Normativity and Norms. Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes [hereafter: 
NN], ed. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 253-61; Nino, La validez del derecho (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Astrea, 1985), at 7-40 et passim; Joseph Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of 
the Basic Norm’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 19 (1974), 94-111, repr. 
in NN (this note, above), 47-67, and in Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009) [hereafter: AL], 122-45; Alf Ross, ‘Validity and 
the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law’, Revista Jurídica 
de Buenos Aires, 4 (1961), 46-93 (bilingual printing), at 82, and see generally 
at 78-82, repr. in NN (this note, above) 147-63, at 160, and see generally at 
159-61.
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Raz, whose statement is in some respects the most extreme 
of the four.  Raz begins by contrasting Hart’s position with 
Kelsen’s.  H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of social normativity, 
understanding ‘[t]he normativity of the law and the 
obligation to obey it [as] distinct notions.’  An altogether 
different understanding, Raz continues, is evident in the 
work of one who recognizes ‘only the conception of justified 
normativity’,42 namely, Hans Kelsen.  In characterizing 
justified normativity, Raz writes: “[T]o judge the law as 
normative is to judge it to be just and to admit that it ought 
to be obeyed.  The concepts of the normativity of the law 
and of the obligation to obey it are analytically tied together. 
Kelsen, therefore, regards the law as valid, that is, normative, 
only if one ought to obey it”.43
Of course Raz sees the paradox in attributing justified 
normativity to Kelsen, a thesis that places Kelsen far closer 
to natural law theory than to anything found in traditional 
or naturalistic legal positivism.  Indeed, Raz invites attention 
to the paradox, writing that although ‘Kelsen rejects natural 
law theories, he consistently uses the natural law concept of 
normativity, i.e. the concept of justified normativity.’44
Interpreters of a philosopher will of course pursue 
what they deem to be the most promising reading of the 
philosopher’s work.  So far, so good, but with a caveat.  Merit 
lies in pursuing what the philosopher actually wrote rather 
than in imposing on the philosopher’s text an interpretation 
‘from without’, so to speak.  As Paul W. Franks puts it in his 
book on the post-Kantians, ‘[i]f we assume that historical 
42  Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’ (n. 41), 105, in NN (n. 41), 60, in 
Raz, AL (n. 41), 137.
43  Ibid.
44  Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’ (n. 41), 110-11, repr. NN (n. 41), 
67, and in Raz, AL (n. 41), 144.
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figures are asking or answering our questions’, we ‘run 
the risk of both distorting what they say and missing an 
opportunity to learn from them, whether positively or 
negatively.’45
Raz, like Alexy, Nino, and Ross, can reply that he is 
drawing an interpretation from the text, not imposing an 
interpretation on it.  The reply is a good one as far as it goes, 
but it gives rise to the question of just how representative 
the passages selected by Raz and the others are.  As I have 
argued at length elsewhere, the passages selected are in fact 
not representative of Kelsen’s work.  And then the point 
made by Franks stands:  We learn best from historical figures 
when we address the questions they themselves were asking 
and answering.  
What, then, takes the place of justified normativity? 
My answer:  Kelsen’s project over many decades was, above 
all, an ambitious and far-reaching attempt, first, to show that 
naturalism in fin de siècle legal science is mistaken, and, second, 
to develop the rudiments of an alternative theory that would 
secure the autonomy (Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the law and, by 
the same token, the purity (Reinheit) of legal science.  And 
this takes us full circle back to the question of normativity. 
Kelsen’s alternative to naturalism yields a normativity thesis, 
and this should come as no surprise.  He has to be committed 
to something that is normative in character lest he have no 
alternative to naturalism after all.  In sharp contrast to the 
45  Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing. Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and 
Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard UP, 
2005), 5.  Of course this idea is hardly new; I quote from Franks because his 
statement of the matter is unusually perspicuous.  To the same effect, see 
John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard UP, 2007), at 251:  ‘[I]n studying the works of the leading writers 
in the philosophical tradition, one guiding precept is to identify correctly 
the problems they were facing, and to understand how they viewed them 
and what questions they were asking.’
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thesis of justified normativity, however, Kelsen’s normativity 
thesis is part and parcel of his greater effort to develop an 
alternative to naturalism and thereby to lend respectability 
to legal science, underscoring its nomological dimension.  I 
call Kelsen’s thesis the nomological normativity thesis.  As 
Kelsen understands the thesis, its import is underscored by 
a ‘law-like’, necessary or nomological connection at the very 
core of his legal philosophy.  In what follows, my primary 
concern is to invite attention to this connection.
Kelsen’s alternative to naturalism is captured in my 
reconstruction by the concept of peripheral imputation.  ‘To 
impute’ (Latin imputare) means to bring into reckoning, to 
ascribe, to attribute.  Kelsen’s German verb is ‘zurechnen’, and 
‘to impute’ is a reliable translation, not least of all in light of 
Kelsen’s own occasional use of the loan-word ‘imputieren’ 
where ‘zurechnen’ might have been expected.46  
 Kelsen has two doctrines of imputation.  The first 
of these, central imputation, is by and large a reflection of 
the philosophical tradition, though Kelsen’s use of central 
imputation is anything but traditional.47  The second doctrine, 
46  As Kelsen writes:  ‘It would be a serious misunderstanding if one wanted 
somehow to impute [imputieren] to these observations [on the legal authority 
of administrative agencies] the significance of a political mandate for the 
greatest possible restriction of the state’s administrative activity.’  Kelsen, 
Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1911), 503, and 
see at 138, 194, 209, repr. in Hans Kelsen Werke, ed. Matthias Jestaedt, vol. 
2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 650, and see at 244, 306, 322.  See also 
Hans Kelsen, Über Grenzen zwischen juristischer und soziologischer Methode 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), at 44.
47  Central imputation serves in Kelsen’s very early work as an escape hatch 
from naturalism and psychologism.  Later he turns to the basic norm, 
already evident in Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völker-
rechts (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1920), and to a Neokantian transcendental 
argument, and these steps represent his effort to replace central imputation 
with something more satisfactory.  To be sure, central imputation survives 
elsewhere in Kelsen’s work.  His most extensive discussion of both imputa-
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peripheral imputation, is peculiar to Kelsen.  Both doctrines 
purport to offer an alternative to causal explanation, and 
both, for this reason, are of unusual significance in Kelsen’s 
legal philosophy – central imputation in Kelsen’s very early 
work, and peripheral imputation thereafter.  I shall confine 
my discussion to the latter, peripheral imputation, for this is 
the doctrine that underlies Kelsen’s nomological normativity 
thesis.
Kelsen tells us that peripheral imputation links ‘material 
facts’ (Tatbestände).  As he puts it in the Allgemeine Staatslehre, 
in what counts as an early statement of the doctrine:  ‘[P]
eripheral imputation always leads from one material fact to 
nothing other than another material fact.’48  A comparable 
statement is found in the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre. 
At the end of a section devoted to the doctrine of central 
imputation, Kelsen contrasts that doctrine with peripheral 
imputation.  Central imputation, he writes,
is an entirely different operation from the peripheral 
imputation mentioned earlier, where a material fact is 
connected…to another material fact within the system, 
that is, where two material facts are linked together in the 
reconstructed legal norm.49
Two questions arise.  What exactly would Kelsen have 
us understand by material facts?  And how might peripheral 
imputation, linking material facts, be formulated?  As to the 
first question, Kelsen answers in terms of ‘legal condition’ 
tion doctrines – central and peripheral – is found in a lengthy essay: Kelsen, 
‘Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge im Völkerrecht’, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 
12 (1932), 481-608, see at §§ 1-2 (pp. 481-504), § 5 (pp. 525-9), § 7 (pp. 537-44).
48  Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1925), § 12 (d) 
(p. 65).
49  Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, a translation of 
the first edition of Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre (1934) by Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) [hereafter: 
LT], § 25 (d) (pp. 50-1).
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and ‘legal consequence’, more precisely, in terms of the 
state of affairs counting as the legal condition in a particular 
instance and, in Hohfeldian parlance, the legal position that 
emerges as its legal consequence.  This seems to be an odd 
fit, for we do not ordinarily think of a legal consequence 
as a material fact (Tatbestand).  Rather, in a hypothetically 
formulated legal norm, a material fact falling within the 
scope of the antecedent clause of the norm triggers the legal 
consequence, establishing, in Kelsen’s doctrine, the legal 
position of liability that counts as the legal consequence.
It is, however, material facts, thus understood, that 
Kelsen brings together in introducing peripheral imputation. 
He writes that ‘[i]f the mode of linking material facts is 
causality in the one case, it is imputation in the other.’50  What 
is more, he uses ‘legal condition’ and ‘legal consequence’ 
alongside ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ as the respective relata of these 
very same ordering principles or relations, imputation and 
causality.51  That is, he understands their relata as species of 
the genus ‘material fact’.
To shed light on Kelsen’s expansion of the notion of 
material facts as the relata of peripheral imputation, it is 
perhaps helpful to point to his effort to provide as close a 
parallel as possible to the principle of causality.  Since he 
assumes material facts to be indisputably the relata in the case 
of causality, so likewise, he is arguing, material facts serve 
as the relata in the case of peripheral imputation.  Kelsen 
wishes to underscore a law-like, necessary or nomological 
relation in the law running parallel to the law-like, necessary 
or nomological relation manifest in causality, and his 
development of this parallel is a central part of his effort to 
reply to naturalism and, by the same token, to turn the legal 
50  Kelsen, LT (n. 49), § 11 (b) (p. 23) (emphasis added).
51  See Kelsen, LT (n. 49), § 11 (b) (at pp. 23-4).
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science of his day into something scientifically respectable.52 
If it can be shown that aspects of the fundamental ordering 
principle of the natural sciences are reflected per analogiam 
in the fundamental ordering principle of legal science, then, 
so Kelsen, the parallel will indeed enhance the status of legal 
science qua science.53  
I turn now to the second question, which speaks to the 
formulation of peripheral imputation.  One proposal for a 
formulation might read (with an ‘and if …’ clause inserted 
between parentheses as a shorthand reference to the other 
conditions associated with a legal proceeding):
Formulation I:  If an act of a certain type takes place (and if), 
then the actor or a surrogate54 is liable for that act.
This formulation is ruled out, however, by Kelsen’s 
stipulation that peripheral imputation links material facts, 
where the latter material fact is understood to be the liability 
imputed to the legal act.  To adopt formulation I as a 
representation of peripheral imputation would be to confuse 
peripheral imputation with central imputation.
The alternative is a ‘subjectless’ counterpart to 
formulation I, that is to say, a formulation that does not 
include an ascription to a legal subject:
Formulation II.  If an act of a certain type takes place (and if), 
then that act is treated as ‘liability ascribing’.
52  See generally Kelsen, Über Grenzen zwischen juristischer und soziologischer 
Methode Grenzen (n. 46), at 1-15 et passim; Horst �reier, Rechtslehre, Staatsso-
ziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 2nd printing (Baden-Baden: No-
mos, 1990), at 1-15 et passim; Horst �reier, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Wissenschaftspro-
gramm’, Die Verwaltung, Beiheft 7: Staatsrechtslehre als Wissenschaft, ed. 
Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007), 81-114.
53  I take up the parallel in the name of methodological forms, see the text at 
nn. 61-6 below.
54  Here I am using ‘surrogate’ to cover all the variations on the theme of 
vicarious and collective liability, see the text at nn. 58-9 below.
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Its counterintuitive character aside, a point to which 
I return below, formulation II captures the import of 
peripheral imputation.  A defensible formulation must 
reflect a necessary connection between the two material 
facts.  And if the formulation is confined, as here, to the act 
and to liability – the liability imputed to the act – then the 
link is indeed necessary. As Kelsen writes:
If there is the necessity of an absolute ‘must’ when the law of nature 
links cause and effect, so there is the equally rigorous ‘ought’ 
when the law of normativity (Rechtsgesetz) sets out the synthesis 
of conditioning and conditioned material facts.  In the sphere of 
the law or in ‘legal reality’,…delict is linked to punishment with 
the same necessity as, in the sphere of nature or in ‘natural reality’, 
cause is linked to effect.55
This is close to being right as a statement of Kelsen’s 
position, though one wrinkle has to be ironed out.  Kelsen 
cannot be claiming a necessary link between the delict and 
the actual imposition of punishment.  That would not make 
good sense, for, as we know and as Kelsen makes perfectly 
clear elsewhere, ‘in the system of nature, punishment may 
fail to materialize for one reason or another’.56  It is not 
punishment but criminal liability – and by the same token 
civil liability – that figures in the law-like, necessary or 
nomological link.  In the most general terms, liability serves 
in this formulation as the second relatum, the second ‘material 
fact’.  The relation of liability to the act to which it is imputed 
is a necessary relation.  By contrast, the actual imposition of 
punishment in the criminal law and the actual execution of 
judgment in the civil law is a contingent matter.57
55  Hans Kelsen, ‘“Foreword” to the Second Printing of Main Problems in the 
Theory of Public Law’, trans. in NN (n. 41), 3-22, at 5 (in the last latter sentence, 
the quotation marks are in the original text).
56  Kelsen, LT (n. 49), § 11 (b) (pp. 25).
57  The point made here can be compared with Hart’s argument directed 
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Still, formulation II seems counterintuitive in imputing 
liability to the act, not to the actor.  We are accustomed 
to distinguishing between the imputation of liability 
individually on the one hand and collectively on the other.58 
In the first case, the imputation of liability is either to the actor 
or, under the rubric of vicarious liability, to a surrogate.  In 
the second case, liability is imputed, say, to the insurance 
company.
Why does Kelsen restrict himself to the imputation of 
liability to the act rather than to the actor? Kelsen’s restriction 
can be explained, I think, by the contingent element 
presupposed in identifying the liable party.  As understood 
in this or that jurisdiction, the character of the liable party – 
actor, surrogate, or collective body – is a contingent factor, 
a question of legal policy, not legal science.  This point 
strengthens Kelsen’s hand in insisting that the necessary link 
be limited to the imputation of liability to the act.  
In any case, it is precisely this necessary relation 
between act and liability that represents the core of what 
I am calling Kelsen’s nomological normativity thesis.  The 
relation is nomological in being necessary or law-like, and 
it is normative in being non-causal.  Further permutations 
stemming from imputation, thus understood, will then be 
forthcoming where liability is ascribed to a person, triggering 
to Austin’s claim that nullity is a sanction.  Hart replies that nullity and 
sanction are conceptually distinct.  Specifically, he points out that a nullity 
follows necessarily from the failure to satisfy the conditions of the legal 
arrangement (Jones purports to marry Sally, but the ‘marriage’ is null and 
void, for he is already married), whereas the actual imposition of a sanction 
is a contingent matter.  See Hart, CL (n. 23), at 33-5, and Austin, Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (n. 17) Lecture XXIII (at p. 457), Lecture XXVII, (at pp. 505 f.).
58  See Kelsen, LT (n. 49), § 13 (at p. 27); Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law 
and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1945), at 
59, 69-71; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. (Vienna: Franz �euticke, 
1960) at § 28 (c) (pp. 125-6).
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the empowerment of a legal organ to follow through with 
whatever sanction is called for.
What remains now is to cast imputation in terms that 
invite attention to the underpinnings of the nomological 
normativity thesis. At some points in his work, Kelsen treats 
imputation as a Kantian or Neokantian category by analogy 
to the category of causation.59  The transcendental argument 
that Kelsen adduces in the name of imputation qua category, 
however, is not sound.  If Kelsen nevertheless utilizes 
imputation in his philosophy as in my sketch above, then 
its foundation requires a closer look.  My suggestion is that 
Kelsen’s concept of peripheral imputation be conceptualized 
as a methodological form, specifically, the methodological form 
peculiar to legal science.  The notion is drawn from the work 
of the Baden Neokantian Heinrich Rickert.
In the last chapter of his treatise, The Object of 
Knowledge,60 Rickert distinguishes the constitutive categories 
of objective reality – for example, the category of permanence 
– from the methodological forms of the various standing 
disciplines.  Rickert’s basic idea is that objective reality, 
constituted transcendentally, must be sharply distinguished 
from the processing (Bearbeitung) of the material given in 
objective reality.  Objective reality, Kant’s phenomenal 
world, is constituted by means of the categories of reality, 
while the processing of the material of objective reality is the 
work of the standing disciplines, which are grounded in their 
respective methodological forms.  Rickert offers lawfulness 
59  See Kelsen, LT (n. 49), § 11 (b) (at p. 23).
60  See Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 2nd edn. (Tübingen and 
Leipzig: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904), at 205-28, Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 
6th edn. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1928), at 401-32.  See also Heinrich Rickert, 
Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (first publ. 1902), 5th 
edn. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1929), at 283-4, 373-7, et passim.
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(Gesetzlichkeit) as an example of a methodological form in 
the natural sciences.61  In fact, the example has to be taken 
as the genus of methodological forms in the natural sciences 
generally, for it has application to all of them.  
In The Object of Knowledge, Rickert begins with the 
constitutive categories of reality: 
The unique significance of…the forms that have been discussed 
in terms of the examples of causality and permanence requires 
that they be given a special name, one that distinguishes them as 
original forms in contrast to methodological forms.  Building on 
the expression ‘objective reality’, we could speak…of ‘objective 
forms of reality’.  But we prefer…the term ‘constitutive’.  In that 
these particular forms constitute what is presupposed as finished 
product or as real material of cognition, ‘constitutive’ designates 
exactly what we mean.  Thus, the categories that shape the 
objective, real world from what is in fact given should be called 
the constitutive categories of reality.62
The methodological forms to which Rickert alludes are 
peculiar, respectively, to the various standing disciplines. 
Referring in his treatise to Cartesian dualism, Rickert writes:
This other species of dualism, according to which the 
world is supposed to consist of two types of reality, each 
excluding the other – the world of extensio and the world 
of cogitatio – is created by physics and by psychology, each 
with its respective methodological form.63
Physics has its own methodological form, and so does 
psychology. Legal science, too, has its own methodological 
form, namely, imputation or, as Kelsen sometimes puts it, 
61  See Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 6th edn. (n. 60), at 409-10.
62  Ibid. at 406-7 (quotation marks and emphasis in original), compare Rickert, 
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 2nd edn. (n. 60), at 211.
63  Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 6th edn. (n. 60), 424 (emphasis in 
original), see also at 404, 410, 411, 424, 426, et passim, and compare Rickert, 
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 2nd edn. (n. 60), at 208, 210, 217, 221, et passim. 
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the ‘law of normativity’.64  As he explains, looking back on 
the theses he defended in Hauptprobleme:
[T]he core problem becomes the reconstructed legal norm, 
understood as the expression of the specific lawfulness, the 
autonomy, of the law, as the legal counterpart to the law of 
nature (Naturgesetz) – the ‘law of the law’, so to speak, the law 
of normativity (Rechtsgesetz) What is obviously of importance 
in Main Problems is securing the objectivity of validity, without 
which there can be no lawfulness whatever, let alone the specific 
lawfulness, the autonomy, of the law.  But without the expression 
of that autonomy, without the law of normativity, there can be no 
legal knowledge, no legal science.  Therefore: objective judgment, 
not subjective imperative.  ‘The law of normativity is – outwardly 
– like the law of nature, in that it is directed to no one and valid 
without regard to whether it is known or recognized.’  If the 
analogy between the law of normativity and the law of nature is 
still fairly limited here, this is in order to prevent the confusion 
of the two, indeed not to lose sight – because of the analogy – of 
the specific lawfulness, the autonomy, of the law as against the 
causal lawfulness of nature.65
The normative or non-naturalistic import of Kelsen’s 
enterprise, the force of his law of normativity, plays itself 
out in the context of nomological legal science, understood 
as Kelsen’s alternative to psychologism and naturalism in 
legal science.  Specifically, the focus is on the methodological 
form of legal science – the relation of peripheral imputation. 
Where the antecedent condition obtains, this marks the 
imputation of liability to the act, a necessary relation.  Where 
the ascription of liability to a person is made, this marks a 
64  See the quotation immediately below.
65  Kelsen, ‘“Foreword” to the Second Printing of Main Problems in the Theory 
of Public Law’ (n. 55), 5-6 (emphasis in original).  Kelsen’s quotation within 
the quotation is from the Hauptprobleme (n. 46), at 395, repr. in Hans Kelsen 
Werke, vol. 2 (n. 46), at 529 (‘outwardly’ appears in italics in the Hauptprob-
leme but not in the ‘Foreword’ quoted here).  See also Kelsen, LT (n. 49), 
§ 11 (b) (at p. 23-5).
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change in that person’s legal position. The change, Kelsen 
insists, is a normative change, not a causal change. 
4. Concluding remark
Coming full circle, back to the Introduction, I should like 
once again to allude to the distinction between inclusive and 
exclusive legal positivism, comparing it with the distinction 
between legal positivism qua naturalism and legal positivism 
without naturalism.  The first distinction has inclusive legal 
positivism riding piggyback on exclusive legal positivism. 
That is, in all those legal systems correctly characterized by 
means of the ‘exclusive’ variant, no distinction whatever is 
marked by inclusive legal positivism; the two views come 
to the same thing.  The second distinction, however, that 
between legal positivism qua naturalism and legal positivism 
without naturalism, marks a difference that is constant. 
That is, a characterization of a given legal system by appeal 
to legal positivism qua naturalism is always different from 
a characterization of the same system by appeal to legal 
positivism without naturalism.
Kelsen, our proponent of legal positivism without 
naturalism, wages battle on two fronts, against natural law 
theory and against naturalism.  And he responds on both 
fronts with doctrines that count as independent doctrines in 
his legal philosophy – ‘independent’ in that neither doctrine 
is derived from the other.  He responds to natural law theory 
with the separation principle and to naturalism with the 
nomological normativity thesis.  The import of these two 
doctrines is to be sharply distinguished from legal positivism 
qua naturalism, where  the separation principle is simply 
a corollary of naturalism and where there is of course no 
nomological normativity thesis.

